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FEDERAL TAX LIEN-FORCED SALE OF THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST
OF A NON-DELINQUENT SPOUSE. United States v. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct.
2132 (1983).
In 1955, Lucille and Phillip Bosco acquired residential property in
Dallas, Texas, which they occupied as their homestead under Texas
law.1 In 1971 and 1972, the federal government issued tax assessments
against Phillip S. Bosco for federal wagering taxes. Phillip died in 1974
with the delinquent taxes unpaid. Lucille remarried and continued to
occupy the property as her homestead.
In 1977, the federal government filed suit against Lucille (now
Mrs. Rodgers) in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas under sections 7402 and 7403 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' The Government sought to reduce to judgment the tax assess-
ments made against Phillip Bosco and to enforce the federal liens
against all property that belonged to Phillip, including his interest in
Mrs. Rodgers' homestead. The district court held that the government's
federal tax lien was subordinate to Mrs. Rodgers' state created right to
1. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50-52. (Vernon 1955); Section 50 provides:
[T]he homestead of a family shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the
payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or a part of such purchase
money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used itfconstructing improve-
ments thereon, and in this last case only when the work and material are contracted for
in writing, with the consent of the wife given in the same manner as is required in
making a sale and conveyance of the homestead; nor shall the owner, if a married man,
sell the homestead without the consent of the wife, given in such manner as may be
prescribed by law. No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the homestead shall ever
be valid . . . (other exceptions not relevant).
See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975).
2. I.R.C. § 7402(a) (1982) provides in part:
The district courts of the United States at the instance of the United States shall have
such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of injunction, and
of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other orders and processes,
and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the
enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
I.R.C. § 7403 (1982) provides in part:
(a) Filing: In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to
discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made, the Attor-
ney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may direct a civil action to
be filed in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States
under this title with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of
whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the
payment of such tax or liability.
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possession of her homestead.' The fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed in United States v. Rogers."
Joerene and Donald Ingram acquired as community property a
residence located in Dallas, Texas, which they occupied as their home-
stead under Texas law.5 In 1972 and 1973, the government issued as-
sessments against Donald Ingram relating to unpaid employee social
security and withholding taxes. In addition, an assessment for unpaid
income tax was issued against both Donald Ingram and Joerene In-
gram for the taxable year 1971.
The Ingram's house was destroyed by fire in March 1975. Pursu-
ant to a divorce entered later that year, the Ingrams divided the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on the house and Donald conveyed his
interest in the house to Joerene. Joerene filed suit in Texas state court
to quiet title to the property and to remove federal tax liens that arose
when the taxes were assessed. The Government removed the suit to
federal district court and counterclaimed seeking, among other things,
a judicial sale of the property to enforce the tax lien.6 The district court
granted summary judgment on the Government's counterclaims. 7
On appeal in Ingram v. City of Dallas Department of Housing &
Urban Rehabilitation,s the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that
the Government could foreclose its lien on the proceeds of the sale of
the property to collect the unpaid income taxes owed by Joerene and
Donald Ingram jointly. But the court, relying on Rogers, which was
decided the same day, held that the Government could not reach the
proceeds of the sale of the property to collect the individual tax liability
of Donald, assuming Joerene had not abandoned her homestead inter-
est. The court remanded for determination of the abandonment issue.9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari for both
Rogers and Ingram, consolidated the cases, and reversed the decisions
of the court of appeals. The Court held that a district court was au-
thorized to order the sale of homestead property to satisfy a federal tax
lien and to compensate the non-delinquent spouse out of the proceeds
3. The district court's opinion was not published.
4. 649 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1981). Mrs. Rodgers name was misspelled in the caption of the
the case.
5. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50-52 (Vernon 1955); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81
(Vernon 1975), supra note 1.
6. While the suit was pending, the property was sold unencumbered. The parties agreed that
their rights in the proceeds would be determined as if the sale had not taken place.
7. The district court's opinion was not published.
8. 649 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. Id.
[Vol. 7:461
FEDERAL TAX LIEN
of the sale. United States v. Rodgers, 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983).
Although in Saxon England a judgment creditor often encountered
difficulties in collection, 0 after the Norman Conquest procedures were
developed that gave a judgment creditor remedies against a debtor. A
creditor had the right to obtain portions of the debtor's personal prop-
erty and to receive rents and profits from the debtor's land to satisfy
the debt." With the passage of the statute authorizing the writ of ele-
git in 1285, a debtor's land could be taken from him to satisfy his
debts." Apparently, a provision in the Magna Carta 3 extended to the
king a similar right at common law. The king could take possession of
the debtor's land until the debt to the king was paid, if the debtor's
goods could not satisfy the judgment." Thus, the sovereign had the
authority and the means to collect debts owned to it by its citizens.
One procedure the United States government may utilize to en-
force collection of unpaid taxes is the exercise of the rights afforded
any judgment creditor. These rights are provided in the Internal Reve-
nue Code.'5
Another option available to the government is the administrative
levy. Section 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the
Secretary to collect such tax . . . by levy upon all property and rights
to property . . . belonging to such person or on which there is a lien
provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax.16
10. See Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, 14 LAW Q. REV. 291 (1898).
Under Anglo-Saxon law, the parties came to court if they agreed to do so. A court lacked the
power to compel attendance. One practical means used by the complaining party to ensure the
appearance of the other party was to take some article as security so the adversary would show.
The primary form of security was cattle.
Final judgment also had its problems. Once obtained, the judgment could not be directly en-
forced. The complaining party was left to gather the "fruits of judgment" for himself.
11. See generally 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *416-19; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIS-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230-31 (2d ed. 1937).
12. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *418. A writ of elegit was authorized by statute
either on a judgment for debt or damages. Westm. 2 13 Edw. I. c. 18, cited in BLACKSTONE, at
*418. Under the writ of elegit, the defendant's goods and chattels were appraised and all of them
(excepting oxen and beasts of the plough) were delivered to the plaintiff in satisfaction of his debt.
If the goods were not sufficient to meet the debt, then the moiety, or one half of the debtor's
freehold lands, was delivered to the plaintiff. The plaintiff held the land until the rent and profits
paid the debt or the defendant's interest in the land expired.
13. MAGNA CARTA cl. 9, reprinted in L. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE TRADITION OF
LIBERTY at 55 (1976).
14. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *418.
15. See I.R.C. §§ 6502(a), 7401, and 7402(a) (1982).
16. I.R.C. § 6331 (1982).
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Administrative levy requires no judicial intervention.
A third alternative the government may utilize is the federal tax
lien. Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code states: "If any person
liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand,
the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person."' 7 The tax lien is created automatically at the time the
assessment is made and continues until the amount of the liability is
paid. 18 Enforcement of the federal tax lien requires judicial interven-
tion which is provided for in section 7403 of the Internal Revenue
Code. 19 Section 7403 allows a district court to decree a sale of property
and apply the proceeds to satisfy the unpaid taxes. Although a federal
statute establishes the lien, the "property or rights of property" re-
ferred to in the statute0 are determined under state law.21 However,
state laws that attempt to exempt "property" or "rights to property"
are not binding with respect to the collection of federal taxes.22 Only
those exemptions provided for by federal law are valid and "state law is
inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens created by Federal stat-
utes."2 Specifically, treasury regulations provide that homestead ex-
emption laws do not exempt property from subjection to a federal
levy.24
A "homestead" is a state created statutory exemption of real prop-
erty from attachment and execution.25 The principal consequences of
characterizing property as a homestead include:
(1) the property is exempt from execution for certain kinds of debts;
17. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
18. Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321
shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for
the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liabil-
ity) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
I.R.C. § 6322 (1982).
19. I.R.C. § 7402(a) (1982), supra note 2.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
22. Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974).
23. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958).
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(c) (1983).
25. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.75 (1952). See also 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAM-
ILY LAWS 629 (1935). A homestead did not exist at common law. Id. The Republic of Texas
originated the homestead exemption in 1839. Act of Jan. 26, 1839, LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
TEXAS, at 125. Georgia and Mississippi followed shortly with similar legislation. 1841 GA. LAWS
at 134, 1841 Miss. LAWS, ch. 15 at 113. The majority of states now have homestead exemption
provisions. See 3 C. VERNIER, supra, at 631; Comment, Debtor Exemption Laws and the Farmer:
Suggestions for Judicial Reform, I1 U.C.D. L. REV. 573, 589 (1978).
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(2) the owner's freedom of disposition is limited, since the consent of
the spouse is required for a conveyance or encumbrance of property;
and (3) the use and disposition of the homestead, after the owner's
death, is regulated for the benefit of his family.26
While the general purpose of a homestead law is to provide security for
the family,27 other purposes have been mentioned. These include en-
couraging home ownership and attracting settlers to an area. 8
In an early federal decision,29 the United States obtained a judg-
ment against the defendants on a warehouse bond and attempted to
levy on the goods and real estate of the defendants.30 The district court
held that the state homestead exemption did not apply because the
North Carolina legislature had not intended to exempt debts owed to
the United States and federal law was supreme when conflicting with
state exemption laws."
In Fink v. O'Neil,82 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the United States could levy on a homestead inter-
est. The Court held that the government could not levy upon the home-
stead interest of the plaintiff." Congress had authorized the district
courts to rely on state law when affording remedies to a judgment cred-
itor and the United States, like any judgment creditor, was subject to
the state's exemption law.34 The Court pointed out that without the
congressional recognition of the state law, the exemption would not
have applied and the government would have been able to levy on the
homestead interest."
While it was settled that homestead interests were not exempt
from federal tax liens," conflicts began to arise among the lower fed-
eral district courts when the government attempted to foreclose its tax
lien on the homestead interest of a non-delinquent spouse. The Eighth
and Ninth Circuits held that the property of the non-delinquent spouse
was not exempt from foreclosure of a federal tax lien and a forced sale
if the delinquent spouse had an interest in the homestead when the tax
26. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.75 (1952).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Howell, 9 F. 674 (W.D.N.C. 1881).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 667.
32. 106 U.S. 272 (1882).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 279.
35. Id. at 280.
36. E.g., Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942).
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liability was assessed.37 The underlying reasons given for these holdings
were that (1) treasury regulations stated that state exemption statutes
have no validity in relation to the federal levying statute;38 (2) the fed-
eral levying statute should be considered the "supreme law of the land"
in relation to state exemption statutes; and (3) the Internal Revenue
Code has provided for certain categories of exempt properties which
are exclusive and do not include a homestead exemption.39
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hershberger,40 held that the
emphasis which a particular state placed in its homestead exemption
determined whether the non-delinquent spouse's interest would be sub-
ject to a forced sale. If the state treated the homestead merely as an
exemption from creditors, then the homestead was not exempt from
foreclosure of a federal tax lien and a forced sale. However, if the state
treated the homestead as an estate or present property right,41 then the
homestead property was exempt from foreclosure of a federal tax lien
and a judicial sale, provided that the non-delinquent spouse retained an
interest in the property."2 The Fifth Circuit had relied upon the same
distinction in holding that the Florida homestead law was merely an
exemption, rather than a property right, and allowed the government to
enforce a federal tax lien through foreclosure on the homestead interest
37. Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Heasley, 283
F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657. (9th Cir. 1947).
38. Treas. Reg. § 301.6334-1(c) (1983).
No other property or rights to property are exempt from levy except the property spe-
cifically exempted by Section 6334(a). No provision of a State law may exempt prop-
erty or rights to property from levy for the collection of any Federal tax. Thus, property
exempt from execution under State personal or homestead exemption laws is, neverthe-
less, subject to levy by the United States for collection of its taxes.
39. I.R.C. § 6334(c) (1982). "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, no prop-
erty or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made
exempt by subsection (a)." Id. Subsection (a) does not include homestead.
40. 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973).
41. Nine states consider the homestead to be more than a "mere exemption" or somewhat in
the nature of an "estate," or "absolute right." See, e.g., Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.
1944); Rash v. Bogart, 226 Ala. 284, 146 So. 814, 816 (1933); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 410 I11. 533,
103 N.E.2d 137 (1951); Sayers v. Childers, 112 Iowa 677, 84 N.W. 938 (1901); Helm v. Helm,
11 Kan. 19 (1873); Riggs v. Sterling, 60 Mich. 643, 27 N.W. 705 (1886); Wyatt v. Bauer, 332
S.W.2d 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Williams v. Williams, 106 Neb. 584, 184 N.W. 114 (1921);
Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929); Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo.
1, 215 P. 485 (1923).
42. The court in Hershberger held that on the basis of Kansas law, which regarded the
homestead as a "present property interest," the federal government could not foreclose its federal
tax lien and force the sale of the property while the non-delinquent spouse still lived there. 475
F.2d at 682. See also Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478, 481 (10th Cir. 1944), where the non-delin-
quent spouse lost because the marriage was illegal and therefore the homestead and accompanying
exemption from the federal lien never existed.
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of the non-delinquent spouse."3
Thus, the United States Supreme Court was left to resolve the
differences that existed among the courts of appeals when the govern-
ment was seeking a forced sale of the homestead interest of a non-
delinquent spouse for taxes that were assessed against the delinquent
spouse while the delinquent spouse had an interest in the property. The
issue was squarely presented to the Court in United States v. Rod-
gers." Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in a five to four deci-
sion, held that a district court was authorized to order the sale of
homestead property to satisfy a federal tax lien and to compensate the
non-delinquent spouse out of the proceeds of the sale. 5 Justice Brennan
stated that the government's lien could not extend beyond the delin-
quent taxpayer's interest in the property and that the government could
not collect more than the value of the property interest that was liable
for the debt." "[Tihe Government may 'enforce [its] lien,' . . . [and]
may seek to subject any property, [of] whatever nature, of the delin-
quent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of
such tax or liability. . .. ,,47 The entire property of the delinquent tax-
payer is subject to sale as long as the United States has a "claim or
interest" in it.' 8
Even though the entire property of the delinquent taxpayer was
subject to sale, the Court emphasized that section 7403(b) authorized
all parties having an interest in the property to be made a party in the
action. 9 The Court noted that this joinder provision would be unneces-
sary if the third party's interest could not be sold.50 In addition, section
7403 provided for the sale and distribution of the proceeds according to
the respective rights of the parties."1
The Court relied upon several factors in its interpretation of the
43. Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913
(1963). For a background to the earlier federal district and Texas state court decisions, see Mor-
gan v. Moynahan, 86 F. Supp. 522 (S.D. Tex. 1949). The court there held that homestead rights
are indivisible and extend to all parts of the property. The non-delinquent spouse's interest is
exempt. Contra United States v. Stone, 572 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)1 9864 (E.D. Tex. 1957). In
Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949), the court held that the wife's home-
stead interest was exempt from a federal tax lien. But see Staley v. Vaughn, 50 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
44. 103 S. Ct. 2132 (1983).
45. Id. at 2136.
46. Id. at 2141.
47. Id. at 2142, quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7403(a) (1982).
48. Id. at 2143.
49. Id. at 2142.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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federal tax lien statute. First, the interpretation "is consistent with the
policy .. . in favor of prompt and certain collection or delinquent
taxes." 52 Next, the Court found historical support for the interpretation
based on an analogy to the states' ad valorem taxation of real prop-
erty."3 A state's sale of property due to non-payment of taxes is an in
rem proceeding that cuts off the dower and homestead rights of the
non-delinquent spouse. The Court noted that, like a state's process, the
federal tax lien proceeding is essentially in rem. Both cut off all dower
and homestead interests.54
Another factor in the interpretation was a comparison of the lan-
guage of the tax lien statute with the language of the administrative
levy provision. 5 The administrative levy remedy allows the government
to sell only the property or rights to property that belong to the delin-
quent taxpayer.56 Since the federal tax lien statute does not contain
such a limitation, the purpose of the federal tax lien statute was to
enable the government to reach the interests of third parties.5 7
Although the statute allowed the government to reach the interests
of third parties, those interests were protected by the statute. The
Court pointed out that the federal tax lien proceeding only used the
third party interest to facilitate the extraction of value from the con-
current property interests that were properly liable for the debt.5 8 Com-
pensation was provided for the "taking" of the property.59
In the second part of the opinion, the Court dealt with the Texas
homestead law. First, the Texas homestead law did not provide an ex-
emption from federal tax liens because a federal tax lien was intended
to reach any property in which the delinquent taxpayer had an inter-
est.60 Second, since the federal statute could reach any property of the
delinquent taxpayer, a state provisions could neither exempt the prop-
erty nor an interest in that property. 1
In addition, the Court found that the supremacy clause 62 provided
the federal government with the authority to overrule state created ex-
52. Id. at 2143.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2143-44.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2145.
60. Id. at 2146.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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emptions and that the clause was just as applicable to innocent by-
standers as it was to delinquent debtors. 3 No constitutional require-
ments were violated by the statute because even though the Texas
homestead law created a property right, the right was compensated for
by payment to the non-delinquent spouse.6'
The last part of the opinion was devoted to the requirement of
compensation for the non-delinquent spouse. The Court pointed out
that financial compensation might not always be an adequate substitute
for the non-delinquent spouse's home"8 and a district court should use
"reasoned discretion" in authorizing a judicial sale of non-delinquent
spouse's interest.6" Several factors were suggested by the Court to assist
the district courts in their use of reasoned discretion." These -factors
include the possible prejudice to the government's financial interests,
the third party's legally recognized expectation that the property would
not be subjected to forced sale, any likely prejudice to the third party
in the form of personal dislocation costs and practical undercompensa-
tion, and the relative character and value of the liable and non-liable
interests in the property.6 8 The Court pointed out that this list was not
exhaustive. 9
Justice Blackmun, writing the dissent, argued that section 7403 of
the Internal Revenue Code gave the government the power to sell or
force the sale of jointly owned property only if the tax debtor himself
could have forced the sale of the property.70 Since a delinquent spouse
could not have forced the sale under the Texas homestead law, neither
could the government. 1 The dissent relied upon the common-law rule
that a creditor's rights rise no higher than those of the debtor himself.72
While in some forms of co-ownership such as joint tenancies or tenan-
cies in common, the individual tenant may seek partition, in other types
such as tenancies by the entirety and certain homestead interests, a
joint owner cannot force partition or destroy the survivorship rights of
the other owner.73 Justice Blackmun stated that in those situations in
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2147.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2148.
66. Id. at 2149.
67. Id. at 2151.
68. Id. at 2151-52.
69. Id. at 2152.
70. Id. at 2153.
71. Id.
72. 1 L. JONES, LIENS § 9 at 9-10 (1914).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2153.
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which the joint owner could not force a partition or sale, the govern-
ment should not be able to exact more as a lienholder than could the
debtor himself.74 Congress did not intend to abrogate the common-law
rule that a creditor's rights rise no higher than those of the debtor him-
self when it passed section 7403.75 The statute should be read in the
light of the common-law rule. 70
Rodgers settled the specific issue of whether the government could
force the sale of a non-delinquent spouse's homestead interest for the
delinquent spouse's unpaid taxes. The decision reconciles the conflict
among the circuits and prevents inconsistent results based on a state's
characterization of its homestead interest.
It should be noted that Rodgers will have its major impact in ar-
eas in which only one spouse is typically liable. Wagering taxes (Rog-
ers) and withholding taxes (Ingram) are two examples of those areas.
The wide spread use of the joint income tax return will prevent Rod-
gers from having a major impact in the area of the income tax since
the spouses are jointly and severally liable.
Other property interests may also be affected by the decision.77
Although the holding does not specifically apply to property held as
tenants by the entirety, the Court implies that it might extend the ap-
plication of the holding to those interests. 8 In a footnote 7 9 the Court
74. Id. at 2154.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1964), the court held that the gov-
ernment may foreclose its federal tax lien on property held under joint tenancy, force the sale of
the entire property and divide the proceeds among the non-indebted owners. See also United
States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
Community property had also been subject to a federal tax lien. In Broday v. United States,
455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972), the court held that a wife, previously assessed for unpaid taxes,
upon remarriage obtained a vested interest in the husband's community income, a bank account.
The wife's half share of the bank account was "property" or "rights to property" to which a
federal tax lien could attach. See also Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964).
78. Earlier cases had held that a federal tax lien could not attach to property held as tenancy
by the entirety. In United States v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958), the government attempted to attach a lien based on tax assess-
ments against the husband alone to property held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.
Because the property was held by both spouses as an estate by the entireties, the Fifth Circuit
held that during the lifetime of the wife, the husband had no interest in the property in which a
tax lien could attach. But upon the wife's death, the tax lien would attach to the husband's inter-
est. The court adopted the rationale given in an earlier case, United States v. Hutcherson, 188
F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951). In Hutcherson, the court held that the federal tax lien could not attach
to property held as an estate by the entirety when only one spouse was liable for the taxes. The
rationale was that an estate by the entirety is a legal fiction in which each spouse owns an entire
estate and not a separable interest to which tax lien could attach.
79. 103 S. Ct. at 2148 n.31.
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states that "if the tenancy by the entirety cases are correct, they do no
more than illustrate the proposition that, in the tax enforcement con-
text, federal law governs the consequences that attach to property in-
terests, but state law governs whether any property interests exist in
the first place. "80 The "if" suggests that the Court might be willing at
some time to find that the tenancy by the entirety interest is property
or right to property to which a federal tax lien may attach.
Although the dissent asserts that the decision would allow the gov-
ernment to force a judicial sale of a farm should the holder of an ease-
ment become delinquent or to force the judicial sale of a building
should the tenant become delinquent," those results are unlikely. Ease-
ments and leaseholds are property interests that have a determinable
value. Since Rodgers only allows the government to extract from the
property or rights to property the interest that the delinquent taxpayer
owned, there would be no advantage in forcing the sale of an entire
building or farm just to get to a lesser interest. The lesser interest has a
value that would be the same, regardless of whether the government
sold an entire interest and extracted the lesser interest or sole the lesser
interest itself. In addition, district courts have at their disposal the au-
thority to use reasoned discretion in ordering the forced sale of any
property. The use of reasoned discretion should alleviate the dissent's
concern that the government may overreach in its attempts to force a
judicial sale of property to recover unpaid taxes.
Allen C. Dobson
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2158.
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